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Abstract
While classifications of mental disorders have existed for over one hundred years, it
still remains unspecified what terms such as ‘mental disorder’, ‘disease’ and ‘illness’
might actually denote. While ontologies have been called in aid to address this
shortfall since the GALEN project of the early 1990s, most attempts thus far have
sought to provide a formal description of the structure of some pre-existing termi-
nology or classification, rather than of the corresponding structures and processes on
the side of the patient.
We here present a view of mental disease that is based on ontological realism and
which follows the principles embodied in Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) and in the
application of BFO in the Ontology of General Medical Science (OGMS). We analyzed
statements about what counts as a mental disease provided (1) in the research
agenda for the DSM-V, and (2) in Pies’ model. The results were used to assess
whether the representational units of BFO and OGMS were adequate as foundations
for a formal representation of the entities in reality that these statements attempt to
describe. We then analyzed the representational units specific to mental disease and
provided corresponding definitions.
Our key contributions lie in the identification of confusions and conflations in the
existing terminology of mental disease and in providing what we believe is a frame-
work for the sort of clear and unambiguous reference to entities on the side of the
patient that is needed in order to avoid these confusions in the future.
Introduction
The Classification of Diseases
There is a long history of attempts to categorize what are commonly referred to as
‘diseases’, ‘disorders’ or ‘illnesses’. These include the development of a series of classifi-
cation systems, of which the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) developed
by the World Health Organization (WHO) is the oldest and most widely used [1]. The
underlying presupposition of such categorial systems is that, for purposes of morbidity
and mortality reporting, patients with the same type of disease should be classified or
categorized by means of the same disease code. This would enable data formulated in
terms of such classifications to be used for purposes such as comparing the incidence
and prevalence of diseases across institutions, jurisdictions, healthcare systems, and so
forth. It would also allow patients to be stratified into homogenous groups in relation
to which the outcomes of given therapeutic interventions could be reliably assessed.
It is Kraepelin who is responsible for introducing into psychiatric diagnosis a catego-
rical approach to classification along these lines [2], an approach which views mental
disorders as organized into discrete clinical categories. Kraepelin was working at a time
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when few technical means were available to assist the diagnostic process, so that clini-
cians had to rely on overt symptoms and signs exhibited by the patient that were
believed to be manifestations of an underlying disorder. Some of these, whether taken in
isolation or in combination with others, were referred to as ‘marker’ symptoms and
signs, and were believed to be pathognomonic for the disorder in question, which means
that they were considered to be so characteristic for the disorder that their presence
alone would render a diagnosis definitive. Such pathognomonic markers were then con-
trasted with those signs and symptoms that provided weaker diagnostic signals and were
thus seen as requiring in addition consideration of the patient’s individual constitution.
Nowadays the most prominent categorical classification system for mental disorders -
where for the moment we are leaving aside the question of the distinction in meaning, if
any, between ‘disorder’ and ‘disease’ - is of course the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM) [3] published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA).
The DSM provides diagnostic criteria to guide the clinician in making a diagnosis,
together with additional information on how to differentiate the instances of any given dis-
order from those instances of other disorders that have similar presenting characteristics.
This criterion-based approach is also applied in the chapter on mental disorders of ICD-
10 (in contrast to what is the case in all other chapters of ICD, which merely list the var-
ious subcategories for each disease). In addition, WHO provided ICD-10 with two distinct
diagnostic guidelines for mental disorders: one for clinical use [4], and one for research
purposes [5]. These guidelines are intended to reduce the variability in coding caused by
two sorts of disagreement which can arise when diagnoses are being made:
(1) differences in opinion amongst clinicians about what type of mental disorder a
patient with a certain configuration of symptoms and test results is suffering from
- in this case the disagreement is about the diagnosis itself, independent of the
diagnostic options offered by the ICD or DSM;
(2) differences in opinion about which ICD or DSM classification code should be
used even in those cases where there is agreement about a diagnosis.
What is a mental disorder?
While ICD and DSM have each provided multiple elaborate systems for the classifica-
tion of mental disease, the more fundamental question, concerning what a mental dis-
ease/disorder/illness actually is, has still not been answered in a satisfactory way [6]. It
is this more fundamental question that we shall address in the present paper.
Szasz has argued provocatively that ‘mental illness is a myth whose function it is to
disguise and thus render more palatable the bitter pill of moral conflicts in human
relations’ [7]. Contrary to some popular misconceptions of his views, Szasz, or so we
assume, did not mean that none of the disorders subsumed by the term ‘mental illness’
exist. Rather he held that the group of persons ‘known to manifest various peculiarities
or disorders of thinking and behavior’ and about which it is therefore said that they
have a mental illness, can be divided into two subgroups:
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(1) those for which there is an underlying brain disorder perhaps not yet discover-
able by what the state of the art is able to offer, examples being patients with
Alzheimer disease or with depression associated with Parkinson’s disease;
(2) those without brain disorder who exhibit in their behavior a ‘deviance ... from
certain psychosocial, ethical, or legal norms’ as judged by themselves, by clinicians,
or by others, for example people preferring solitude or for whom family relation-
ships are not important while living in a society that values company and family
very highly.
Those in group (1), according to Szasz, would be better described as having a brain
disorder, while those in group (2), while they might indeed have ‘problems of living’,
and thus be suffering, are not suffering because of some disorder of a special, mental
kind. Szasz hereby rejects as fallacious the view which regards social intercourse ‘as
something inherently harmonious, its disturbance being due solely to the presence of
“mental illness” in many people’.
Others, such as Jablensky, raise the question whether psychiatry really needs an over-
arching and universal definition of ‘mental disorder’ at all [8], and it is indeed a fact
that neither WHO nor the APA provide definitions for this term. The ‘Lexicon of psy-
chiatric and mental health terms’, which was prepared by WHO to accompany the
mental disorder chapters of ICD-9 and ICD-10, says only that ‘mental disorder’ is ‘An
imprecise term designating any disorder of the mind, acquired or congenital’ [9]. The
more specific term ‘organic mental disorder’ it defines as ‘a range of mental disorders
grouped together on the basis of their having in common a demonstrable etiology in cer-
ebral disease, brain injury, or other insult, leading to cerebral dysfunction’. The lexicon
provides no clue as to whether WHO rules out the existence of mental disorders
which are not due to some disorder of the brain, and it is in any case stated in the
ICD-10 chapter on mental disorders that the term ‘disorder’ is used rather loosely [4].
It is thus no surprise that the associated research agenda for the new edition (DSM-V)
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, scheduled for release in May 2013, calls for
the generation of acceptable definitions for ‘mental disorder’, ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ [10].
In what follows, we present the foundations of an ontology of mental disease that is
intended to contribute to the formulation of such definitions.
Background
Ontologies are created to serve multiple goals, including: supporting effective retrieval
of data, reducing the detrimental effects of silo formation in biomedical databases
caused by differences in the underlying information models and terminologies used,
and allowing different sorts of formal reasoning. Sadly, while developing ontologies has
become over the past decade a popular activity, the lack of shared and well-tested prin-
ciples for ontology development has resulted in a multitude of ontology-like artifacts of
different sorts, whose effect has been to exacerbate, rather than solve, the problem of
data silos. An exception is the Open Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) Foundry [11] initia-
tive, which accepts under its label only those ontologies that adhere to the principles of
ontological realism [12]. Where the prevailing, i.e. computer science, view of ontology
is focused on the logical consistency and inferential implications of ontologies as
sets of assertions, the view of the OBO Foundry is that the quality of an ontology is
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also - indeed primarily - determined by the accuracy with which it represents the pre-
existing structure of reality [13]. Ontologies, from this perspective, are representational
artifacts, comprising a taxonomy as their central backbone, whose representational
units are intended to designate universals (such as human being and patient role) or
classes defined in terms of universals (such as patient, a class encompassing human
beings in which there inheres a patient role) and certain relations between them [14].
Here the terms ‘universal’ and ‘class’ are thus used to refer to entities in reality of the
sorts denoted by the general terms in scientific and clinical textbooks. A class is, in
mathematical terms, a set of individuals of one or other sort. Depending on whether
the representational units designate correctly, the following distinctions are made:
• Referring representational unit (RRU): an RU which is both intended to denote
something and does indeed succeed in doing so.
• Non-referring representational unit (NRU): an RU which, for whatever reason,
fails to denote something.
• Unrecognized non-referring representational unit (UNRU): an NRU which,
although non-referring, is intended and believed to have a referent.
• Recognized non-referring representational unit (RNRU): an NRU which was once
intended and believed to have a referent, but which, as a result of advances in
knowledge, is no longer believed to do so.
• Representational unit component (RUC): a component of a representational arti-
fact that is not intended by the artifact’s authors to refer in isolation.
For an ontology of mental disease to be acceptable as an OBO Foundry ontology, it
must adhere to the Foundry’s principles and build further on relevant feeder ontolo-
gies, which in our present case are the Basic Formal Ontology (including the underly-
ing Granular Partition Theory) and the Ontology of General Medical Science. For an
ontology to be adequate as a foundation for the formal representation and classifica-
tion of different types of mental disorders, its representational units need to be able to
represent what it is for something to be a mental disorder. We use Pies’ model of
mental disorder as a test for the satisfaction of this latter criterion.
Basic Formal Ontology
Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) is an upper-level ontology framework encapsulating best
practices in the development of ontologies to serve scientific research. BFO is being used as
basis for the creation of high-quality shared ontologies especially in the biomedical research
domains. BFO is a realist ontology [15,16]. This means, most importantly, that representa-
tions faithful to BFO can acknowledge only those entities which exist in (for example,
biological) reality; thus they must reject all those types of putative negative entities - lacks,
absences, non-existents, possibilia, and the like - which are sometimes postulated as arti-
facts of specific terminologies or of associated logical or computational frameworks [12].
As an example, consider the following DSM-IV criteria for autistic disorder:
• failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental level,
• a lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests, or achievements with
other people,
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• lack of varied, spontaneous make-believe play or social imitative play appropriate
to developmental level.
Certainly there exist reports containing terms such as ‘lack’ or ‘absence’; these reports
are information artifacts, and as such they pose no problems for BFO. Processes such
as developing peer relationships or seeking to share enjoyment or spontaneous make-
believe play, too, can be represented in ontologies compatible with BFO - not, how-
ever, the lack or absence of such processes. Rather, the latter - often referred to as
negative findings - have to be described exclusively by appeal to entities that do exist
in reality, along the lines described in [17,18]. Lack of spontaneous make-believe play
in some child (Jim) would thus be described in roughly this way: Not (Jim participan-
t_of some instance of make-believe play).
BFO captures a small number of basic categories into which reality - or major por-
tions thereof - is divided. First, it distinguishes particulars from universals; particulars
are entities such as John, or the specific depression from which John (and he alone)
has been suffering since last year; universals (represented by terms which are picked
out in Bold Small Capitals), are repeatable entities, such as Human Beingand
Depression, which have particulars as their instances [12].
Second, BFO distinguishes within the realm of particulars between continuants and
occurrents. Continuants are entities - such as John, his brain, his brain cells - that
endure continuously through time while undergoing changes of various sorts. The
domain of occurrents is made up of processes, entities which unfold over a certain
time span through successive temporal parts or phases, including entities such as
actions, and of the instantaneous boundaries of processes (beginnings and endings).
Where continuants are extended in space and endure through time, processes are
extended in both time and (in most cases) also space. What this means is that pro-
cesses but not continuants can be partitioned along the time access: the occurrent
entity that is your life, for example, can be divided into parts called ‘your gastrulation’,
‘your childhood’, ‘your adulthood’ and so on.
Third, there is the distinction between dependent and independent entities, the for-
mer being such that they cannot exist without some instance of the latter: John’s
height or weight, for example, cannot exist without John himself, and neither can his
depression, or his feelings of remorse, or his bouts of anger. All processes are depen-
dent entities: each process depends on at least one continuant.
BFO also distinguishes three major families of relations (depicted in bold italic face)
between entities in the categories just distinguished: (1) <p, p>-relations: from particu-
lar to particular (for example: part of between John’s brain and John; member of
between Dr McX and the clinical staff of hospital Y; participant_of between Jim and
his life); (2) <p, u>-relations: from particular to universal (for example: instance_of
between John and the universal Human Being); and (3) <u, u>-relations: from univer-
sal to universal (for example: subkind_of between Mouseand Organism) [19].
Granular Partition Theory
Granular partition theory is a framework for understanding the ways in which, when
cataloguing, classifying, mapping or indeed diagnosing a certain portion of reality
(POR), we divide up or partition this reality at one or more levels of granularity [20].
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The resultant partitions are composed of partition units (analogous to the cells in a
grid, to which labels may or may not be assigned), and the theory provides a formal
account of the different ways in which such units can correspond or fail to correspond
to the entities in reality towards which they are directed. It takes account also of the
degree to which a partition represents the part-whole structure of the domain onto
which it is projected, and of the degree of completeness with which a partition repre-
sents this domain.
Drawing on this framework, we have proposed in [21-23] a calculus for use in quality
assurance of the complex representations created for clinical or research purposes, for
example in coding of clinical trial data. The calculus is based on a distinction between
three levels: [14]
(1) Level L1: the level of reality (for example, in the medical domain, the reality of
pains, wounds, bacteria, on the side of the patient);
(2) Level L2: the level of cognitive representations of this reality, for example as
embodied in observations and interpretations, as well as in beliefs, desires and
other mental acts and states on the part of patients, clinicians, and others;
(3) Level L3: the level of publicly accessible concretizations of L2 cognitive repre-
sentations in information artifacts of various sorts, of which ontologies, terminolo-
gies and Electronic Health Records are examples, as also are categorical systems
such as the DSM.
The relation is_about can then hold between entities on levels L2 and L3 and corre-
sponding level 1 entities.
By distinguishing these three levels we are able, for instance, to differentiate clearly
between disorders and diseases on the one hand and diagnoses on the other. Disorders
and diseases are L1 entities - they exist in first-order reality, on the side of the patient.
Diagnoses, in contrast, belong to either L2 or L3, depending on whether they are for-
mulated in a clinician’s mind, or in an entry in an Electronic Health Record. Diagnoses
are about particular disorder and disease instances. Papers published in scientific jour-
nals are (on our view) about corresponding universals or classes.
Representations in general are composed in modular fashion of sub-representations
built out of representational units (representations none of whose proper parts are
themselves representations), the latter being assumed by their authors to correspond to
some POR. We note that:
1. each such representational unit is assumed by its author to be veridical, i.e. to
conform to some relevant POR as conceived on the best current (scientific, or diag-
nostic) understanding (which may, of course, be based on errors);
2. several units may correspond to the same POR, for instance because they rely on
different though still veridical views or perspectives, for instance at different levels
of granularity (one thing may be described both as being brown and as reflecting
light of a certain wavelength; one event may be described both as an event of buy-
ing and as an event of selling);
3. what units to include in a representation depends on the purposes which the
representation is designed to serve.
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The primary representational units in ontologies are terms from some natural or for-
mal language that are assumed to denote universals [12]. Some terms, such as ‘Bodily
Feature’ in Table 1 (taken over from OGMS), do not denote directly, but are rather
abbreviations standing in for disjunctions of terms that do denote in this sense.
Note that where terms in ontologies refer to universals, information artifacts of other
sorts, including clinical records, clinical histories, reports of lab results, consist over-
whelmingly of representational units that refer to instances, for example to patient-
specific entities such as the specific feelings of depression experienced by patient McY
during a certain period, or to McY’s subsequent suicide attempts.
The Ontology of General Medical Science
The Ontology of General Medical Science (OGMS) is an ongoing endeavor to facilitate
inference across the boundaries of domain ontologies created to support research on
Electronic Health Record (EHR) technology and on the integration of clinical and
research data. It has been described by Jobst Landgrebe, former Co-Chair of the HL7
Table 1 Disease-related definitions extracted and/or modified from the BFO-based
Ontology of General Medical Science (OGMS) 25 and other sources
Generic Term Level of
reality
Type Definition
Bodily
Component
L1 IC Material Object within or on the surface of an Organism, including
Anatomical Structures, body flora, pathogens, toxins, and their
combinations, potentially including also the organism as a whole [25,32]
Bodily
Feature
L1 POR Bodily Component, Bodily Quality, or Bodily Process [25]
Bodily
Process
L1 O Process in which at least one Bodily Component of an Organism
participates [25]
Bodily
Quality
L1 DC Quality inhering in a Bodily Component [25]
Clinical
Phenotype
L1 POR a clinically abnormal Phenotype [25]
Clinical
Picture
L2/L3 POR a Representation of a clinical phenotype that is inferred from the
combination of laboratory, image and clinical findings about a given
Organism [25].
Diagnosis L2/L3 DC Representation asserting the presence of an instance of Disease in a
given Organism resulting from an interpretive process that has as input
a clinical picture of that Organism [25]
Disease L1 DC a Disposition (i) to undergo Pathological Processes that (ii) exists in an
Organism because of one or more disorders in that Organism [25]
Disease
Course
L1 O the totality of all Processes through which a given Disease instance is
realized [25]
Disease
Phenotype
L1 POR a Clinical Phenotype that is characteristic of a single Disease [25]
Disorder L1 IC A combination of Bodily Components of or in an Organism that is
clinically abnormal [25,41]
Observation L2 DC Cognitive Representation about a Bodily Feature resulting from an act
of perception [42]
Pathological
Process
L1 O a Bodily Process that is a manifestation of a Disorder [25]
Phenotype L1 POR a combination of one or more Bodily Features of an Organism
determined by the interaction of its genetic make-up and environment [25]
L1 - L2 - L3: level of reality at which a portion of reality exists; IC: independent continuant; DC: dependent continuant;
O: occurrent; POR: used either where a term is an abbreviation for a disjunction or where the term refers to an entity
which instantiates some combination of universals.
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Vocabulary Group, as ‘the best ontology effort in the whole biomedical domain by far’
(personal email communication, Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 11:45 AM). OGMS comprises
representations of highly general universals in the domains of anatomy, physiology and
pathology, of diagnosis and treatment, and of information artifacts such as clinical his-
tories and lab test results [24,25]. It follows the principles of the OBO (Open Biomedi-
cal Ontologies) Foundry, of which the most important for our purposes are:
1. avoid redundancy: terms already included in existing ontologies should be
imported where necessary in order to ensure that for each domain there should be
convergence upon exactly one Foundry ontology; [26]
2. exploit compositionality: terms and definitions should be built up compositionally
out of component representations taken either from OGMS itself or from external
ontologies; [11]
3. common architecture: ontologies should use upper-level categories drawn from
BFO together with relations unambiguously defined according to the pattern set
forth in the OBO Relation Ontology; [19]
Figure 1 depicts in simple form the entities which exist on the side of a specific per-
son when that person (an instance of Organism) has a disease. These include a Dis-
ease instance (this specific case of disease in this specific organism), which inheres_in
that person, and the person thereby exemplifies the corresponding Disease universal.
This Disease universal can be exemplified also by other persons. The Disease
instance is a Disposition to processes of certain process universals, for example as
manifested in the form of observable signs and symptoms.
Table 1 lists the terms from OGMS and related sources which we used to create
definitions for entities in the realm of mental diseases. OGMS rests on the presupposi-
tion that the signs and symptoms associated with instances of disease, even those
symptoms standardly qualified as being ‘mental’ - such as erroneous thoughts, difficul-
ties in concentration, or auditory hallucinations - have in every case a physical basis.
Following OGMS we will use the term ‘disorder’ to refer exclusively to this physical
basis on the side of the patient. To assert that something is clinically abnormal is then
to state:
Organism universal Disease universal            Process universal
Organism instance
inheres in 
Disease instance Process instance
instantiates
exemplifies
instantiates
has participant
instantiates
disposes to
Figure 1 Ontological relations involving disease and bearer of disease
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(1) that it is not part of the life plan for an organism of the relevant type (thus
aging or pregnancy are not clinically abnormal),
(2) that it is causally linked to an elevated risk of pain or suffering or other feelings
of illness or of death or dysfunction on the part of the organism, and
(3) that it is such that this elevated risk exceeds a certain threshold level.
Where, under the OGMS view, disorders are independent continuants (in simple
terms, they are disordered parts of the patient’s body), instances of the universal Disease
are dependent continuants. Disorders are independent continuants because they are all
material objects or aggregates thereof. Diseases are dependent entities because no dis-
ease can exist without some organism (such as a human being) to serve as its bearer.
Diseases are continuants in that they endure through time while being associated with
different sorts of changes, for example leading to more intense symptoms, or giving rise
to new pathological structures within the body (e.g. progressively larger tumors). A dis-
ease is, more specifically, a continuant of the type disposition, defined in Basic Formal
Ontology as: (1) a dependent entity that inheres in an independent continuant (its
bearer) and is (2) that in virtue of which this bearer will participate in specific sorts of
processes when certain (trigger) conditions are satisfied. Where is a disposition, there is
thus a potentiality or tendency for certain things to happen. Examples are: the disposi-
tion of a human being to become sad when a loved one dies, or to become nervous
when brought into a stressful situation. Human beings exhibit a wide variety of disposi-
tions, some associated with health, others with disease. Diseases are special sorts of dis-
positions: they are dispositions realized in pathological processes [25].
In their capacity as dispositions, diseases are analogous to functions (e.g. of a bodily
organ). Dispositions in general and functions in particular are realized in processes (as
the function of your heart is realized inter alia in those processes which are pumpings
of blood). Diseases may thus also be characterized as dysfunctions. Just as a particular
function (for example of your heart) comes into existence at a certain time (the time
when your heart first begins to exist), so a particular disease comes into existence at a
certain time and gives rise thereafter to a typically complex series of processes, some-
times including manifestations that can be identified as signs and symptoms. These
processes form (i.e. are part of) a second entity (an occurrent), for which we use the
term disease course, and which we can think of as the life of the disease.
In turn, some of these processes may give rise to further continuants, such as a cyst
or a redness of the skin, which come into existence as a result of processes such as
inflammations. The relevant disposition can be instigated by a bodily aggressor such as
a virus that enters the body, by biomolecular reactions that go wrong, or by processes
which occur as the body defends itself against environment assaults. It can also come
into existence as a result of a structural deviation in a person’s genetic code resulting
in a congenital disease.
The Tourette disease, for example, is characterized by both genetic markers and the
presence of chemical abnormalities at the cellular and metabolic level in the brains of
those who have the disease. One who has the genetic markers has the anatomical mal-
formation and thus the disposition to the Tourette disease. Analogously, the influenza
disease is marked by the presence of influenza virus infecting cells and reproducing,
and is accompanied by numerous symptoms including fever, sore joints, and so on.
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Pies’ account of the evolution of a disease entity
Pies proposes in [27] a 5-stage account of how our scientific understanding of a mental
disease condition might evolve over time. His goal is a framework that will allow us to
determine
whether a condition represents, in the first place, dis-ease and, secondarily, whether
it constitutes a specific disease, on a par with, say, bipolar I disorder? For example,
how do we decide whether to consider “pathological bigotry” and “internet addic-
tion” as specific mental disorders? [27]
Following the view presented by Kendell in [28], Pies requires that for a mental dis-
order instance to exist - and note that Pies does not provide definitions for what he
means by the terms ‘disease’ and ‘disorder’ - it must be the case that ‘prolonged and
severe suffering and incapacity in the affective, cognitive, or interpersonal-behavioral
realms’ form part of the disease course. The evolution of our understanding of a men-
tal disorder universal he then sees as passing through five stages:
• Stage 1 involves an acknowledgement of the patient’s everyday experience of sub-
stantial and prolonged suffering and incapacity that is ‘specified in terms of social
and vocational impairment, impaired vital functions, and distortions in the phe-
nomenological realm (feeling “totally worthless,” “like I’m nothing”)’. This must be
acknowledged as an intrinsic element of having the condition and not simply as a
consequence of society’s punitive responses to the person’s behavior.
• Stage 2 is marked by the acceptance of a general syndromal description of the
condition, supported by evidence that the constituent signs and symptoms reliably
‘hang together’ over long periods and in geographically distant populations.
• Stage 3 is marked by the fact that the syndrome has been characterized by
authoritative sources in terms of usual course, outcome, comorbidity, familial pat-
tern, and response to treatment; there may also be preliminary data on pathophy-
siology and biomarkers, and a more specific understanding of the afflicted person’s
phenomenology.
• Stage 4 is marked by known pathophysiology, cause, a specific set of biomarkers,
and in some cases an inheritance pattern for the condition (or for multiple condi-
tions that become identified as separate entities only after Stage 2, as occurred for
example in the case of anemia or diabetes).
• Stage 5 is characterized by the availability of a precise chromosomal and biomole-
cular etiology, and by a specification of the phenomenology, for all disease subtypes.
The relevance of the above to our argument will be explained in the section that
follows.
Methodology
Our methodology, which we have dubbed ‘ontological realism’ [12], is based on our
previous work in building and assessing the quality of biomedical terminologies, coding
and classification systems [21,23,29,30]. It stands in sharp contrast both to the termi-
nological approach to ontology, which tries to identify the meanings of terms [31], and
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to the concept-based approach, which focuses on mere logical consistency. Our metho-
dology starts out in every case with the attempt to identify the sorts of entities that
exist in the salient portion of reality according to the best current scientific under-
standing. In our case here, it is the portion of reality described by Pies’ model [27] and
by the relevant parts of the ‘Research Agenda for the DSM-V’ [10] that is of relevance.
Pies’ model has the advantage for our purposes that it does not rest on any assump-
tion of incompatibility between biological and phenomenological data relating to what
exists on the side of the patient. Rather it sees the distinction between the two sorts of
data as resulting from complementary modes of analysis and observation. Pies is of
importance also because he recognizes that ‘best current scientific understanding’ will
take different forms at different stages of its development. Note that whether Pies is
right in his analysis is not important here; what matters is whether our framework is
able to represent what is believed to exist as expressed in his model.
The research agenda for the DSM-V, which serves as our second source, does not pro-
vide definitions for the terms ‘mental disease’, ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental disorder’, but
gives some informal statements as to what these terms might mean, statements which
can be supplemented by some associated passages found in the diagnostic criteria for
the various types of mental diseases provided in the current version of the DSM.
BFO provides for our analysis an initial set of top-level representational units which
are independent of any specific domain. OGMS, using BFO as foundation, expands the
range of representational units to embrace the terms of general medical science. The
first step in our analysis was thus the identification of relevant terms in the list of stages
in the evolution of a disease entity recommended by Pies. For each of these terms, we
then assessed whether it could denote either (i) one or other of the entities or relations
described in section 2 or (ii) some configuration of such entities and relations. The ques-
tion that is addressed in this step is thus, not the terminological question: what do the
identified terms in Pies’ model mean?, but rather the ontological question: to what enti-
ties in reality do these terms refer? We then, in the second stage, assessed for each of the
identified entities whether they belong to the portion of reality described by either BFO
or OGMS at the more general level, or to the more specific portion of reality to be
described in our proposed Ontology of Mental Disease (OMD). For each entity at the
level of BFO or OGMS, a corresponding representational unit had to be found, other-
wise these ontologies would be marked by an unjustified gap [22]. For each entity per-
taining strictly to the realm of mental health, we introduced a corresponding
representational unit in OMD and attempted to create an associated Aristotelian defini-
tion [19] using representational units already defined in OMD, BFO, OGMS or in any
other suitable external ontology. Here again we needed to check for the unjustified
absence of representational units at the level of BFO and OGMS. The adequacy of BFO
and OGMS as foundations for a formal representation of the entities in reality that the
statements under scrutiny in Pies’ model and the DSM-V research agenda attempt to
describe was then measured in terms of any unjustified absences found.
Results
We present here a set of terms and definitions representing the core entities involved in
the phenomenon of mental disease, building further on BFO and OGMS (see Table 1).
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For each term, we indicate whether it refers
1. to an independent or dependent continuant universal (IC or DC),
2. to an occurrent universal (O)
3. to some portion of reality that is described through some logical combination of
terms representing such universals (marked here with ‘POR’).
Figure 2 contains an overview of the entities which we believe will need to play a
foundational role in a future OMD alongside the entities already represented in BFO
and OGMS.
To say that the patient has a mental disease is to say that there is some Mental Dis-
order instance in the patient. This is, in OGMS terms, the physical basis of the corre-
sponding Disease instance. As a part of the organism it is, like the organism itself, an
independent continuant (IC). This Disease instance is a certain disposition (DC),
which inheres in the corresponding disorder in the patient, and is itself the potentiality
for (and is realized in) instances of Pathological Mental Process (O) of certain pro-
cess types, for example as manifested in the form of signs and symptoms. Typically,
multiple patterns of such processes - multiple presentations, in other words, or what
we shall officially call multiple Disease Courses (O) - will be associated with the same
Disorder type, for example in reflection of the presence or absence of pharmaceutical
or other interventions, of differences in environmental influence, and so forth.
Figure 2 Foundational entities for an ontology of mental disease. Shape coding: terms in squared
boxes are from feeder ontologies such as BFO and OGMS; terms in rounded boxes are specific to the
Ontology of Mental Disease. Color coding: L1 continuants (first order entities) are depicted in yellow, L2/L3
continuants (representations) in orange; processes are depicted in green, abbreviations for disjunctions are
in light blue. Red, unlabeled arrows indicate subsumption; black arrows are labeled according to the
relation they depict, the label being either under or right from the arrows. Some obvious relationships
have been left out to keep the figure intelligible.
Ceusters and Smith Journal of Biomedical Semantics 2010, 1:10
http://www.jbiomedsem.com/content/1/1/10
Page 12 of 23
In addition to the disorder-related entities are the various Representations of these
and other entities, not only on the side of the clinician, but also - and this is a phe-
nomenon of exceptional importance in the case of mental disease - on the side of the
patient [14].
We assume, with OGMS, that Cognitive Representations - and other L2 entities
such as beliefs, emotions and desires - have a physical basis (in the brain), in the rele-
vant components of which there occur processes of certain sorts such as: activations of
neurons, formation of synapses between cells, and flow of electrons (measurable, per-
haps, by means of encephalograms). For convenience in what follows we shall call the
corresponding physical components in the patient organism - components which are
involved in both mental disease and normal cognitive functioning - ‘mental functioning
related anatomical structures’.
A cognitive representation can participate in processes of different sorts. It can be
generated: a cat crosses your path and causes your visual system to induce a configura-
tion - a mental image - in your brain that allows you to describe the cat . It can be
sustained: your mental image of the cat is kept in memory and allows you to describe
the cat at later times. Or it is modified: you become aware that what you thought was
a cat was not in fact a cat at all, but rather a raccoon.
A cognitive representation can in this way be about some other entity (the cat,
again; or cats in general); or it can be, for example, a matter of hallucination, so that
there is no entity which serves as that towards which it is directed (though of course
the agent of the hallucinating act may believe that there is such an entity). On the rea-
list strategy hallucinations and similar phenomena are then dealt with not as entities
that are directed towards special kinds of objects (since there are, ex hypothesi, no
such objects), but rather as special kinds of cognitive representations. Representations
of this sort are, following the definitions provided earlier, non-referring representa-
tional units or what we shall henceforth refer to as NRUs.
Mental health related entities that can exist in the absence of any mental disorder
• Mental Functioning Related Anatomical Structure (L1, IC) =def. Anatomical
Structure in which there inheres the Disposition to be the agent of a Mental
Process.
• Behavior Inducing State (L1, DC) =def. Bodily Quality inhering in a Mental
Functioning Related Anatomical Structure which leads to Behavior of some spe-
cific sort.
• Mental Process (L1, O) = def. Bodily Process which brings into being, sustains
or modifies a Cognitive Representation or a Behavior Inducing State.
• Behavior (L1, O) =def. a Process having Processes as parts in which an Organ-
ism participates as agent in response to external or internal stimuli and following
some pattern which is dependent upon some combination of that Organism’s
internal state and external conditions. (Derived from the Gene Ontology; see also
[30]).
• Interpersonal Process(L1, O) =def. Process in which at least two Human
Beings are agents.
• Interpersonal Behavior (L1, O) = def. Behavior having Interpersonal processes
as parts, each involving the same instances of Human Being.
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• Representation (L1,DC) = def. Dependent Continuant which is about a portion
of reality.
• Affective Representation (L2, DC) =def. Cognitive Representation sustained by
an Organism about its own emotions.
• Cognitive Representation (L2, DC) = def. Representation which specifically
depends on an Anatomical Structure in the cognitive system of an Organism.
Mental disorder related core entities
• Mental Disorder (L1, IC) =def. Disorder in a Mental Functioning Related
Anatomical Structure.
• Pathological Mental Process (L2, O) = def. Pathological Process which is the
manifestation of a Mental Disorder.
• Mental Disease (L1, DC) = def. a Disease which is a Disposition to undergo
Pathological Mental Processes.
• Mental Disease Course (L1, O) = def. Disease Course of a Mental Disease.
• Manifestation of a Mental Disease (L1, POR) = def. a Bodily Feature of an
Organism that is (a) a deviation from clinical normality that is the realization of a
Mental Disease and is (b) observable.
Diagnosis related core entities
• Diagnosis of Mental Disease (L2/L3, POR) = def. Diagnosis asserting the pre-
sence of an instance of Mental Disease in a given Organism.
• Disease Picture (L3, DC) = def. Representation of a Disease Phenotype con-
cretized in some information artifact.
• Disease Picture Component (L3, POR) = def. Representational Unit which is a
part of some Disease Picture and which either (1) represents (or is believed to
represent) a Bodily Feature that is believed to be manifested in the Disease Phe-
notype represented by the Disease Picture of which it is a component or
(2) expresses a negative finding (as discussed in [17]).
• Collection of Marker Features for Disease X (L3, DC) =def. Representation
which is a collection of Disease Picture Components which are characteristic for
Disease X (where ‘X’ serves as placeholder for some disease name).
Discussion
The purpose of definitions
The definitions formulated in the foregoing are not definitions for familiar words or
terms in their familiar usage. Thus in particular our proposed definitions for the terms
‘mental disease’, ‘disease course’, and ‘disorder’ clearly do not capture the uses of these
terms that are predominant in the literature. This is for multiple reasons, not the least
of which is our striving for clarity and consistency - where clear and consistent distinc-
tions between these and cognate terms are not in general drawn. That this is a pro-
blem is recognized already in the DSM, and in attempting to solve it we are in fact
addressing a challenge formulated by the DSM itself. What is essential from our point
of view - and this goes to the very heart of ontological realism [12] - is first, to point
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out the salient types of entities that exist, and then to associate with each of them a
name that, in conjunction with its definition, allows the reader to understand what we
mean by this term both here and in future work. We do not suggest that all the terms
proposed in the above should be used by clinicians, although moves in this direction
would help to make medical jargon less ambiguous (while at the same time potentially
bringing other costs). What is more important is a broad recognition of the existence
of the types of entities denoted by these terms, since without this broad recognition
we will not achieve the sort of terminological clarity that is needed for computational
purposes such as integration of mental health data with biological and other sorts of
data. Finding better terms for the entities in question is, in this light, a secondary issue.
In this connection it is important to bear in mind that definitions for terms, and for
representational units in general, may serve different purposes. These purposes are: [32]
P1: to specify the conditions that must be satisfied for a term to be an acceptable
designator for a given entity in some given community. Such definitions often
reflect decisions concerning more or less arbitrarily selected thresholds in relation
to measured quantities or qualities marked by gradiants. Examples are the defini-
tion for ‘severe mental retardation’ in ICD-10 in terms of an IQ of less than 34, or
of ‘chronic pain’, defined as pain lasting longer than 3 months;
P2: to specify what is characteristic of particulars that instantiate a certain univer-
sal, for example: disorder = def. a combination of bodily components of or in an
organism that is clinically abnormal;
P3: to demarcate groups by specifying characteristics that their members must
exhibit, for example: depressions in patients that participated in clinical trial X.
P1 definitions are essentially terminological. Often they are associated with decisions
of a more or less arbitrary sort. The definition for ‘chronic pain’ excludes the use of
this term for pains lasting less than 3 months. This does not mean, however, that a
pain in a specific patient that has already lasted for 90 days becomes a chronic pain
exactly one day later. A chronic pain was, ontologically, chronic already from the very
beginning, even though this fact was unknown to any observer. Similarly, there are ter-
minological, but not medical, arguments for claiming that two patients with otherwise
similar clinical pictures suffer from instances of distinct disease types because
one patient has a disease picture component ‘IQ = 33’ while the other has component
‘IQ = 35’.
P2 and P3 definitions can help in determining whether a given particular is to be
classified in a given way. P2 definitions fulfill this role at the level of universals (corre-
sponding to what is the case in reality ‘following the laws of nature’), while P3 defini-
tions reflect demarcations made by decree.
Application of definitions
The definitions pertaining to diagnostic criteria that are currently in use, for example
in the DSM, are of types P1 or P3. The goal is, of course, for all definitions to be of
type P2. Such definitions should specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for
some entity to be an instance of the universal that is being defined.
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The definitions that we provide in our framework require some familiarity with the
practical dimensions of the realism-based approach to ontology if their implications
are to be properly understood. As an example, one might wrongly assume that the
brain itself is a mental functioning related anatomical structure as defined here, and
that therefore any brain disorder is also a mental disorder. This, however, is not the
case, since there are brain disorders such as aneurysms which are not mental disorders.
Many types of mental disease are in addition such that the underlying etiology and
pathophysiological mechanisms are not yet fully understood, although science is, we
believe, making impressive advances in this regard (albeit with occasional reverses).
Almost all theories of mental disease do indeed resort in some way to abnormalities in
parts of the brain. But the careful reader will have noticed that in our definitions it is
nowhere specified in what parts of the body mental functioning related anatomical
structures are assumed to exist. It is up to neuroscientists to specify which anatomical
structures are mental functioning related in the sense here at issue and as such are the
agents of instances of Mental Process in which a Cognitive Representation or Beha-
vior Inducing State bring into being. If, in the future, it were discovered that, for
example, cells in the sense organs play a role in the generation, maintenance or modifi-
cation of cognitive representations, then no change to our framework would be
required in order for this new information to be accommodated.
As a further example, it has been shown that patients with major depression exhibit
an increased number of cells in the limbic thalamus [33]. Even if it were discovered
that the cells in question were causally involved in the corresponding dispositions on
the side of the patient, however, it would still be wrong to infer that the entire limbic
thalamus is a mental functioning related anatomical structure under the definition pro-
vided. If this sort of inference were valid, then the entire human body would deserve
the same status. It is for this reason, too, that we do not specify in our framework that
if part of an anatomical structure is a mental functioning related anatomical structure,
then the entire structure of which it is part is also a structure of this type.
Mental diseases, disorders and illnesses
The universals Cognitive Representation (including Affective Representation as sub-
type) and Behavior Inducing State play a key role in our ontology. For it is by refer-
ence to these universals that we define the universal Mental Process, reference to
which is used in turn to describe the universal Mental Functioning Related Anato-
mical Structure, instances of which are the seat of mental diseases.
Building on this basis, we can now describe a person with canonically good mental
health as one who exhibits a close conformity of perception, emotion, and behavior both
among themselves and in relation to the surrounding real-world environment. In other
words, in a mentally healthy person, perceptions and emotions coincide with reality and
behavior is appropriate to its context. Mental disease is then, drawing on the OGMS
perspective on disease in general, a clinically significant deviation from mental health as
so defined, a deviation that hampers the bearer in his or her mental well-being.
Our view of mental disease thus corresponds in part with Derek Bolton’s account,
which sees mental disease as involving a “radical failure of intentionality“ [6], where
‘intentionality’ refers to the capacity of our brain to generate cognitive representations
that are about or stand for things, properties and states of affairs in reality [34].
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In a mentally healthy person, intentionality simply works. If an individual’s being
healthy depends in this way upon the degree of correlation of perceptions, emotions
and behavior to reality, then a mental disease exists where there is impairment due to
a disorder in the intentionality-related and thus mental functioning related parts of the
patient’s body.
Mental diseases and diagnostic criteria
Since at least the emergence of DSM-III, mental disorder diagnosis and treatment has
rested on the assumption of two underlying needs (1) to identify physiological/neurolo-
gical etiology and (2) to employ evidence-based approaches to treatment. Because of the
history of the DSM, however, the classification of disorders remains a hodgepodge,
which means that science that would support the realization of the two identified needs
is not able to benefit from data coded on the basis of existing revisions of the DSM.
The initial challenge for developing an ontology of various subtypes of mental dis-
eases is that of sorting out an inventory for the higher-level universals Mental Disease,
Disorder and Disease course along the lines set forth above. For in order to be able
to classify the different types of mental disease, one must know what a mental disease
is, and what distinguishes mental disease from, say, non-mental disease. While some
have argued that there are no such universal higher-level types - for example because
what counts as ‘mental disease’ is entirely contingent upon culture - research on the
basis of the prevailing biomedical model of mental illness is providing increasing evi-
dence to suggest otherwise. Certainly there are, for a number of different reasons, dif-
ferences from culture to culture as concerns what is counted as clinically significant in
the realm of mental disease. But just as influenza infection causes the same type of dis-
ease throughout the world even in spite of cultural differences in the way this infection
and its consequences are described, so, we would argue, schizophrenia and other men-
tal illnesses exist as commonly recognized types of dysfunction even in spite of cultural
differences in the categorical schemes used to describe it. The OGMS-based definition
of mental disease that we have proposed accounts for the existence of these universals,
and we believe that it will ultimately help to replace faulty categorical schemes with a
new, and more robust, account of disorder, disease and disease course of a sort that
will enable a more robust bridge between clinical and biological data.
This optimism needs however to be tempered by the perspective that our under-
standing of the etiology of diseases in general and of mental diseases in particular is
and will continue to be subject to rapid changes as a result of advances in the relevant
biomedical sciences and associated assay technologies. Thus we need always to bear in
mind that what is originally perceived as being a single disease type might later turn
out to be a plurality of distinct diseases whose instances manifest in similar fashion
despite distinct underlying etiologies. We are confident, however, that our framework
provides resources for such changes to be accurately represented, and this precisely
because of (1) the distinctions we have drawn between (a) disorder, disease, disease
course and disease phenotype on the side of the patient, and (b) the representations
thereof for example on the side of the clinician, and (2) our view that diseases are dis-
positions, and therefore such that the nature of their manifestations is dependent on
the circumstances which bring them to realization. It is precisely the lack of such onto-
logical distinctions in traditional descriptions of ‘disease’ that leads to the errors, for
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example of a type which involve focusing not on ‘disease’ but rather on ‘diagnosis’ - for
example because a patient presents with symptoms whose pathophysiological basis is
not yet fully understood.
The framework presented here can help to avoid such errors because its basis in
OGMS allows it to do justice in consistent fashion to a range of distinctions not easily
captured in traditional approaches, including:
• the distinction between Mental Disease instances that do and those do not lead
to instances of Mental Pathological Processes,
• the fact that a given Clinical Picture instance may reveal only certain parts of
the corresponding Mental Disease Course, or it may reveal only certain untypical
aspects of the canonical Disease Course for a disease of the given type -for exam-
ple because it was created before certain diagnostic tests or procedures became
available,
• the fact that phenotypically similar Mental Disease Course instances may be the
result of dissimilar Mental Disease instances.
And because these distinctions can be made, it is possible for the framework to cre-
ate multiple different classifications which yet remain mutually comparable, potentially
including multiple classifications which can be shown to be equally valid from an onto-
logical perspective. This mutual comparability is important above all because it allows
data collected on the basis of the different classifications to be exploited for research
purposes - for example in the evidence-based revision of the DSM.
Reformulating Pies’ model
To see how this works, we show how the framework allows in particular the reformu-
lation of Pies’ model in such a way that all five stages are formulated in a consistent
fashion. The central organizing feature of his account is then seen to lie in the fact
that at each stage there are Observations of Bodily Features at different levels of
granularity that are relevant to the diagnosisof mental disorder. At least one of these
phenomena must itself either be, or be a cause of, something that can be viewed from
the perspective of the patient himself as a matter of ‘prolonged and severe suffering and
incapacity in the affective, cognitive, or interpersonal-behavioral realms’. Pies provides
accounts of patients who describe themselves as feeling, for example ‘totally worthless’,
‘... like I’m nothing’. It is important to be clear about the complex nature of the goal
Pies has set himself in this connection, a goal which obliges him to skirt very close to
the edge of definitional circularity. For he is seeking to establish when, in the course of
the development of our scientific knowledge, it is justified to assert that a mental dis-
ease (by which we understand him to mean a mental disease type in the categorical
sense) exists and is exemplified by multiple patients. The complexity arises because
part of such justification will involve appeals to experiences on the parts of patients or
potential patients which themselves refer to, or are directed towards, phenomena
which might be classified as mental disease.
Pies’ view is that the discovery of a mental disease type starts with the acknowledge-
ment by the patient of his or her suffering in the affective, cognitive, or interpersonal-
behavioral realm and that such suffering is ‘an intrinsic element of the condition’.
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A first stage diagnosis does not as yet involve any assertion as to what specific type
of mental disease a patient is suffering from. Rather it conveys a belief (L2) or state-
ment (L3) on the part of the clinician to the effect that the patient has some instance
of some mental disease.
Pies’ second stage involves the recognition that a multiplicity of patients exhibit a
similar Clinical Picture as defined in Table 1. In the ideal case, these Clinical Pic-
tures (L2/L3) are accurate representations of underlying Clinical Phenotypes (L1);
but things may go wrong, specifically when different observers are independently
describing distinct patients in the absence of standardized diagnostic tools and of asso-
ciated classificatory resources. Patients with a similar Clinical Phenotype may then
become associated with Clinical Pictures of distinct sorts, or patients with distinct
Clinical Phenotypes may be believed to exhibit a similar Clinical Picture. Further-
more, at this stage, according to the Pies model, we have only a general syndromal
description of a condition. Thus it is not yet possible to infer that, because patients
exhibit a similar Clinical Phenotype they also exhibit any common Disease Pheno-
type (i.e. a phenotype characteristic of some single disease).
Note that, for something to be a Disease Picture, it is not required that all the Dis-
ease Picture Components included within it are correctly so included. Each Disease
Picture Component belongs to one of the categories identified for representational
units, although it might not be known at any given time which one precisely. We can
however assume that, when a responsible authority publishes a Disease Picture, then
it is assumed by that authority that all Disease Picture Components are Referring
Representational Units (RRUs).
For stage 3, Pies’ ‘course’ corresponds to OGMS’ Disease Course, and his ‘usual
course’ translates into OGMS’ Disease Phenotype (Table 1). Entities that correspond
to Pies’ notions of ‘outcome’, ‘comorbidity’, ‘pathophysiology’ and ‘response to treat-
ment’ are all examples of the processes that form part of the Disease Course for any
given mental disease. Of course, for any subtype of Mental Disease, there are corre-
sponding subtypes of such processes ranging from the appearance of hallucinations,
mood changes, irrational thinking on the one hand, to molecular and cellular processes
of various sorts on the other.
Stage 3 refers also to the presence of a familial pattern, something that can become
apparent from data collections about sibling relations between patients who exhibit a
Mental Disease Course of the same type. What Pies refers to as ‘biomarkers’, and ‘a
more specific understanding of the afflicted person’s phenomenology’ are represented
by means of our Disease Picture Component and Collection of Marker Features.
Pies’ later stages thus do not require the introduction of further types of entities at
higher levels, but rather the accumulation of more instance data, and a deepening of
the taxonomies of processes and bodily components.
Future work: towards a full-fledged ontology of mental disease
In this paper, we focused on the question: what is a mental disease? Our answer to this
question will, in the next stage, be expanded into an ontology of the various mental dis-
eases which form the subtypes of the universal Mental Disease. This will involve a tax-
onomy not only of such subtypes but also of associated physiological and pathological
processes (thereby in part linking to other ontologies such as the Gene Ontology [21]).
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It will require also evidence-based assertions about which of these processes are parts of
the disease courses corresponding to the mental diseases of the different distinguished
subtypes. Our long-term objective is to develop an ontology of mental disease along
these lines. This ontology should in addition accomplish the goals of (1) serving as a
bridge ontology with other classifications of mental disorders like the ICD, (2) enabling
field and clinical data collection through electronic medical records that would be inter-
operable with other existing modes of diagnoses and treatment, and (3) solving the fol-
lowing problems with DSM as summarized in the DSM-V Research agenda [35]:
a) severely ill inpatients often meet criteria for more than one DSM-IV personality
disorder, so that according to this system there would be a high rate of co-morbid-
ity even where there is no medical or etiologic reason for assuming the co-exis-
tence of two or more separate disorders in the mentioned patients;
b) many outpatients do not meet the criteria for any of the specific categories iden-
tified in DSM-IV;
c) the diagnostic thresholds separating what is normal from what is disordered are
subject to frequent revision, so that it is sometimes as if given disorders would
appear and disappear in course of time, and this both at the level of the diagnoses
formulated for individual patients and at the level of disease types.
These problems have been used as arguments to favor an alternative, so-called
dimensional approach, according to which disorders would be described in terms of
points or regions along a number of ‘diagnostic continua’. Where, for instance in the
case of depression, the categorical school postulates that patients who are both
depressed and anxious as instantiating two disorder types, the dimensional school
regards them as cases of ‘anxious depression’ [36], conceiving depression and anxiety
as overlapping regions within a multidimensional continuum whose dimensions are
defined in terms of different sorts of observable variations, examples being severity or
frequency of occurrence. Thus whereas the categorical approach requires assessments
to be made whether a patient exhibits a symptom or configuration of symptoms which
is considered to be pathognomonic for some mental disorder, the dimensional
approach highlights the necessity of assessments in terms of, for instance, the severity
of a symptom or the frequency with which it is manifested. Reconciling the dimen-
sional and categorical views, another request made in the DSM-V Research Agenda, is
thus another goal that we hope to reach with the framework here proposed.
One issue is that for a number of the diagnostic categories mentioned in DSM-IV we
still lack any scientific base for the understanding of the corresponding disorder types.
As an example, it is part of the DSM Research Agenda that a definition of ‘mental
disorder’ should be such (a) that it ‘can be used as a criterion for assessing potential
candidates for inclusion in the classification, and deletions from it’ and (b) that there
should be ‘at least no ambiguity about the reason that individual candidate diagnoses
are included or excluded’ [10]. It is stated also that if a satisfactory definition of
‘disease’ can be formulated at all, then it should take into account both biomedical and
sociopolitical considerations.
We have argued that, to achieve this needed scientific basis, our realist approach
must be supplemented by what we have identified as the referent tracking strategy [37]
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in the treatment of patient information. This strategy provides a formal mechanism for
linking ontologies to the EHR and other patient data repositories, providing the latter
with the needed anchor in the reality on the side of the patient. Unfortunately, the
widespread use of entity-relationship and object-oriented modeling approaches still
presents an obstacle to effective progress on this front, since these approaches are
designed to support the construction not of representations of reality but rather of
what have been called ‘models of information’. And while this contrast is not yet
widely understood [38,39], we are beginning to see new applications of the referent
tracking approach outside the realm of its original designers [40].
Conclusions
By using the realism based approach we have been able to identify certain confusions
and conflations in the clinical terminology around mental disease, disorder, and illness.
To bring clarity, we presented an ontology resting on the identification of mental dis-
eases as dispositions which exist because of underlying disorders in mental functioning
related anatomical structures and which become realized in pathological processes that
make up the relevant disease course. By being rooted in Basic Formal Ontology and in
the Ontology of General Medical Science our ontology is fully compatible with other
ontologies that adhere to the principles of the Open Biomedical Ontology Foundry. A
further strength is that our approach is not based on any specific theory of mind, nor
does it commit us to either the categorical or dimensional view on mental disease.
Although we believe that it is possible to express by means of our framework such the-
ories of the mind as might be advanced, future work in this direction will be required
in order to put this claim to the test. Such work will include a complete re-representa-
tion of the entities described by the diagnostic criteria of both ICD and DSM.
Devising an ontology of mental disease consistent with other biomedical ontologies
poses obvious potential benefits. Among these are: better communication among disci-
plines, coordinated diagnosis and treatment, as well as clinical trials and drug develop-
ment aided by interoperable biomedical and psychiatric ontologies. Of course, the
ultimate potential benefit, if our proposals are soundly based, will be better mental
health for patients.
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